The majority of Israelis support Netanyahu
Al-Ahram, Egypt, March 21
If Netanyahu had been certain that the families of Israeli hostages in Gaza and their sympathizers wielded enough political power to threaten his tenure, he would not have committed his latest crime—resuming the assault on Gaza with such ferocity that more than 360 people were killed in just the first five hours.
This sends a chilling message to those demonstrating for the release of the hostages: Their loved ones’ lives are now in grave danger, just as other captives have perished in past bombardments. Netanyahu does not know their exact locations, and his indiscriminate strikes offer no assurance of their safety.
In other words, he subscribes to a brutal calculus in which eliminating as many of Israel’s enemies as possible takes precedence over protecting the lives of Israeli hostages—an argument voiced most brazenly by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich.
Moreover, Netanyahu is fully aware that most political parties, their leaders, and the broader public endorse his actions against Palestinian civilians; their disagreements with him are limited to tactical details, not moral objections.
He would not have agreed to the ceasefire last January had it not been for pressure from Trump, who insisted on halting hostilities before assuming office. At the outset of his latest bombing campaign, Netanyahu made a point of announcing that he had briefed Trump beforehand, a statement later corroborated by the White House press secretary.
His first personal gain from this latest aggression came within hours: the postponement of his corruption trial. The Israeli attorney general announced last week that Netanyahu’s testimony would be delayed due to the renewed fighting in Gaza—an abrupt reversal from just three weeks prior, when prosecutors had rejected his request to slow down proceedings, emphasizing the urgency of expediting testimony.
They had even warned him to comply with court decisions. Yet, none of this prevented him from orchestrating a courtroom spectacle, theatrically receiving a sealed envelope mid-testimony and interrupting the session on the pretext of an urgent security matter.
Ahmed Abdel-Tawwab
The price of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon
Al Rai, Kuwait, March 21
Amid the region’s volatile complexities—evident in the wars in Gaza and Yemen, as well as tensions involving Lebanon and Syria—Lebanon has no interest in engaging in a military confrontation with its neighbors. Any such confrontation, if instigated by Hezbollah as an escape from its deepening crisis, would ultimately serve only Iran’s agenda.
Likewise, Syria has no stake in any form of conflict with Lebanon, particularly at a time when both nations are navigating a delicate transitional phase aimed, among other objectives, at restoring normal bilateral relations. This new reality opens the door for the long-overdue demarcation of the Lebanese-Syrian border, dismantling the illusions that once governed the Syrian Alawite regime—illusions that collapsed with Bashar Assad’s flight to Moscow on December 8, 2024.
A stable environment would also allow Lebanon to regain control over its borders and territory by fully implementing Resolution 1701, free from Hezbollah’s aspirations and, by extension, Iran’s influence. More crucially, Lebanon has no interest in serving Iran’s calculations, in which the country is manipulated to undermine stability in Syria.
Now more than ever, Lebanon must summon the courage to confront the pressing questions it can no longer evade—chief among them: how to secure an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon and at what cost, given the well-known American conditions.
When the Islamic Republic instructed Hezbollah to intervene in Syria to prop up Bashar Assad’s regime, it was a clear demonstration that Iran’s expansionist project in the region far outweighed internationally recognized borders. Syria must now come to terms with the fact that Iran cannot reconcile with the loss of the Alawite regime, which was an indispensable conduit for transferring weapons and funds to Hezbollah. From this perspective, Syria will have to contend with Iran’s relentless attempts to reassert control over Damascus.
Syria is not a mere detail in the so-called “regional crescent” that connects Tehran to Beirut via Baghdad and Damascus—it is a vital link in that chain. Without it, the entire structure collapses. Iran, grappling with internal divisions is desperately defending its remaining regional footholds, whether through the Houthis in Yemen or Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Tehran must prove that Hezbollah has not faded with the downfall of the Syrian regime, that it retains influence in both Lebanon and Syria, and that it remains an indispensable force. Iran also seeks to reaffirm its capacity to intervene in Syria, either to aid remnants of the old regime or to ensure Syria continues functioning as a corridor for arms transfers and other illicit activities. This includes the trafficking of drugs—particularly Captagon—to the Gulf states, weapons smuggling to Jordan, and, of course, the ongoing flow of arms into Lebanon.
It is in Lebanon’s best interest to reach an understanding with the new Syrian government regarding border control—a necessity for enforcing Resolution 1701, as well as an Arab and international priority in the broader fight against smuggling in all its forms. In other words, Lebanon must recognize that now is not the time for friction with the new Syrian government, regardless of Iran’s desires.
Our country can no longer afford to skirt around the central issue: Hezbollah’s weapons—effectively Iranian weapons—have brought nothing but destruction and ruin to Lebanon and its people. Addressing this arsenal is not just an option but a necessity if Lebanon is to confront reality and the responsibilities that come with it, including the imperative to resolve the lingering Israeli occupation that has been exacerbated by the so-called “support for Gaza” war.
A new reality is taking shape—one in which Hezbollah, along with all other arms of the Islamic Republic across the region, has suffered a decisive defeat. This setback comes even as Israel, under full American backing, continues to commit relentless brutality—protected by Washington’s unwavering support for Benjamin Netanyahu, a leader who, in the words of a senior Arab official who has met with him, “believes himself to be the president of the United States.”
The sooner Lebanon initiates a serious discussion about the future of Hezbollah’s weapons, the smoother the path will be toward addressing the real deadline that matters for its future: determining what must be done to end the occupation and confronting the unavoidable price of either securing its resolution or perpetuating its existence.
Kheirallah Kheirallah
Lessons from Zelensky’s White House controversy
Okaz, Saudi Arabia, March 22
During his meeting with US President Donald Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky faced a complex web of diplomatic, political, and strategic challenges that required meticulous preparation, adaptability, and a sharp understanding of both international and domestic dynamics. His ability to navigate these hurdles depended on his capacity to adjust to shifting circumstances and deliver clear, persuasive messages that advanced Ukraine’s interests.
However, the exchange in the Oval Office between Trump, his vice president, and Zelensky exposed significant weaknesses in the Ukrainian leader’s approach—his lack of coordination, inadequate preparation for a pivotal meeting, and an overall failure to uphold fundamental political principles. It became evident that Zelensky misjudged the nature of the press conference, treating it as though it were a debate between political candidates rather than a high-stakes diplomatic engagement. This miscalculation underscored a poor assessment of the situation.
From this event, there are crucial lessons that extend beyond politics and can be applied to various aspects of life, including business, negotiation, and personal interactions.
First: Avoid speaking in a language you are not proficient in during critical conversations. It is risky to engage in a discussion with an adversary using a language in which you lack fluency. Zelensky is not highly proficient in English, yet he conducted a conversation of immense importance in it, leading to misunderstandings and the possibility of conveying unintended messages.
Second: Adequate preparation is key to success. Proper preparation is essential to ensuring that discussions unfold smoothly and lead to the desired outcomes. This was notably absent on the Ukrainian side, particularly given that the new US administration held views at odds with Ukraine’s and perceived Ukraine’s engagement in its ongoing war as a strategic miscalculation.
Third: A well-defined negotiation strategy is indispensable. Successful negotiations require a structured approach that includes assessing one’s own position, understanding the priorities of the opposing side, and determining key areas of compromise. The Ukrainian delegation displayed a glaring deficiency in this regard, adhering to the same political rhetoric it had employed with the previous administration under Joe Biden and its European allies, despite the fact that the new US administration held an entirely different perspective. Moreover, Zelensky failed to offer any significant concessions to align with the shifting geopolitical landscape.
Fourth: Avoid unnecessary confrontation—explain your stance without arguing. Attempting to force the other party into agreement or publicly posturing as the dominant voice is counterproductive. What matters most is articulating one’s perspective in a way that is clear and compelling. Zelensky’s approach in the White House deviated from this principle, as he engaged in debate and argument with the US president rather than focusing on effectively communicating Ukraine’s position. This misstep did not serve his country’s interests as he had intended.
The lessons from this incident offer valuable insights into the principles of communication, negotiation, and strategic preparation—lessons that are not confined to the realm of politics but are equally relevant in business, personal interactions, and decision-making in everyday life. Proper preparation, effective messaging, and a well-crafted negotiation strategy can mean the difference between success and failure in high-stakes engagements, whether on the global stage or in our daily affairs.
Osama Yamani
The Hezbollah paradox
Nidaa Al Watan, Lebanon, March 21
Hezbollah’s actions and rhetoric have become increasingly contradictory, particularly in the aftermath of its defeat by Israel. On one hand, it seeks to assert itself as the ultimate authority, acting as both the state and the dominant power, yet on the other, it scrambles for protection under the very state it undermines—having lost the political and strategic umbrellas it once relied on, from its leadership structure to the Assad regime.
This contradiction is evident in its stance toward the Lebanese Army. It calls for the army’s presence in the town of Hawsh al-Sayyid Ali, yet the moment the army arrives, Hezbollah unleashes its loyalists to hurl insults, level accusations, and brand army officers and soldiers as “agents” and “Zionists.”
What exactly does Hezbollah want? In practical terms, it wants to revert to the status quo before October 8, 2023, when it launched its operation against Israel. But history does not move in reverse—especially not in war. The reality on the ground has changed entirely.
Hezbollah has suffered devastating losses, including two of its top leaders, Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine, along with over 30 of its highest-ranking field commanders and more than 120 mid-level field officers. Hundreds of others have been rendered unfit for service, and it has lost much of its military infrastructure south of the Litani River, including key tunnel networks and ammunition depots.
Externally, the situation is just as dire. Hezbollah has lost what was once its greatest strategic asset: the Syrian lever. With the fall of the Assad regime, it no longer enjoys the logistical and territorial depth that allowed it to operate with impunity. Forced to retreat into Lebanon’s borders, it has attempted to revive its long-standing mantra of “the people, the army, and the resistance.”
But this is where the contradiction deepens: How can it cling to this formula while simultaneously discrediting one of its supposed pillars—the Lebanese Army? The party’s own loyalists have accused the army’s officers and soldiers of treason, labeling them “Zionist agents,” effectively dismantling the very equation Hezbollah seeks to uphold. What remains is an absurd inversion: “the people, the Zionists, and the resistance.”
Hezbollah is now ensnared in its own rhetoric—demanding the army’s protection while actively eroding its legitimacy. Simply repeating the claim of “embracing the army” is no longer enough. If Hezbollah truly seeks legitimacy, it must do more than just pay lip service to the idea of national unity; it must accept the reality that the Lebanese Army alone has the rightful monopoly on weapons.
Until Hezbollah reaches this level of acknowledgment, the rhetoric of its officials—including the latest remarks by MP Hussein Hajj Hassan—is nothing more than a smokescreen, an attempt to obscure the fundamental contradiction of a movement that, on one hand, demands the army’s support, while on the other, denounces it as a traitor.
The real test for Hezbollah is whether it can confront this paradox—or whether it will continue to evade the inevitable reckoning with Lebanon’s sovereignty.
Jean Feghali
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.