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The IDF on Friday published its investigation into Hamas' attack on Kibbutz Nir Oz on October 7, revealing shocking failures. At the height of the murderous invasion, 500 bloodthirsty terrorists stormed the small community of 385 residents, who clung to their shelter doors with their last strength — without a single soldier present.
The terrorists executed entire families, burned people alive and abducted civilians without interference until they were ordered from Gaza to return to Khan Younis. Only six homes in the entire kibbutz were left untouched.
The heroism of seven members of the local alert squad, who were either murdered or kidnapped while fighting 150 Nukhba terrorists, prevented an even greater disaster. The community remains far from recovery.
40 minutes too late
Forty minutes passed from the moment the last of the roughly 500 terrorists left Nir Oz at 12:30 p.m. until any security force entered the kibbutz. The first to arrive were undercover Border Police officers responding to a police dispatch — not the IDF. The military was completely unaware of the massacre unfolding in Nir Oz for over seven hours.
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A map detailing the events during the terror attack on Kibbutz Nir Oz:
(Photo: IDF Spokesperson's Unit)
"This was the failure within the failure of October 7," admitted former IDF chief of staff Herzi Halevi to the survivors on Thursday, asking for their forgiveness. Officers accompanying him quickly realized that the traumatized residents, now living in Kiryat Gat, remained far from rehabilitation and had not received the unique governmental support they desperately needed.
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Former IDF chief of staff Herzi Halevi
(Photo: REUTERS/Amir Cohen, עמוס בן גרשום, לע"מ)
The IDF's investigation into the fall of Nir Oz spanned eight months and gathered thousands of testimonies, recordings and images. The complexity of the findings led the military to appoint Maj. Gen. (res.) Eran Niv, a former commander of the IDF's West Bank divisions, to head the inquiry.
Niv had prior experience dealing with chaos, having commanded Hebron Brigade during the Second Intifada in 2005 when terrorists massacred Israelis near the Cave of the Patriarchs, killing the regional brigade commander, Col. Dror Weinberg.
Unlike that attack, the Nir Oz investigation lacked an IDF force that had fought inside the kibbutz, making it reliant on traumatized civilian survivors, injured witnesses, limited intelligence and terrorist interrogations.
At the end of the investigation, Niv said that reconstructing the events at Nir Oz reminded him of the Hebrew poem "In the City of Slaughter," which described the 1903 Kishinev pogrom. Every Nir Oz resident was affected by the October 7 massacre — whether by execution, burning, kidnapping or injury.
Only six homes were left untouched before the terrorists received an order around noon to retreat to Gaza, with commanders telling them: "You're done." Roughly 10% of the 5,000 terrorists who invaded the western Negev took part in the kibbutz massacre, which was largely forgotten on that black Saturday.
Over 500 terrorists against civilians
At the peak of the attack, there were more Gazan terrorists in Nir Oz than Israeli civilians, with no IDF troops present. Between 400 and 500 terrorists overran the kibbutz, where 385 civilians (out of 420 residents) were present that morning, including foreign workers.
Nir Oz, located just 1.8 miles (3 km) from Gaza near Khan Younis, had no military outpost between it and the border — a longstanding failure of the IDF Southern Command. Without the residents’ desperate fight to hold their shelter doors, an entire Israeli community could have been wiped out in the absence of any security forces for hours.
On October 7, 47 civilians were murdered in Nir Oz, including six who were attending a nearby party. Seventy-six were kidnapped to Khan Younis — 67 alive, nine dead. Of them, 49 were later returned to Israel in hostage deals with Hamas. One released hostage, Hanna Katzir, died months after returning.
Thirteen Nir Oz captives were executed in Hamas captivity, 13 bodies were returned and 14 remain in Gaza — five alive, nine deceased.
Critical military failures
The investigation included a recording from the deputy commander of Golani Brigade's 51st Battalion, responsible for the sector that weekend, saying over military radio that a quiet weekend was expected with no border protests.
The battalion had 182 combat soldiers and 57 support personnel in the northern Eshkol region, prepared for an infiltration scenario from a single point without warning. Near their base, Judy and Gadi Weinstein were preparing for their 6:06 a.m. morning walk, unaware they would be Nir Oz’s first victims that day.
Although not classified as a 'border-adjacent' community like Nahal Oz or Kfar Aza, Nir Oz is situated very close to the Gaza border. That morning, 450 rockets were fired at the area, targeting IDF outposts defending not only Nir Oz but nearby kibbutzim like Nirim, Kissufim, Magen and Ein Hashlosha.
The first Golani forces in the region were operating outside their base due to a revised protocol that had replaced an older dawn-readiness procedure. As a result, when the attack began at 6:30 a.m., the troops moved toward the border instead of the kibbutzim — a mistake later acknowledged in the investigation. This left Nir Oz particularly vulnerable.
Two stationary IDF tanks were assigned to the Nir Oz sector that morning, one was found to be inoperable. This was the same tank later paraded as a Hamas victory symbol, with terrorists waving Palestinian flags atop it. Survivors from Golani units harshly criticized the IDF for stripping them of basic combat equipment, such as fragmentation grenades and LAW missiles, which could have helped counter the attack.
A significant portion of the investigation focused on the heroism of Nir Oz’s emergency alert squad — seven armed residents who fought 150 terrorists, delaying some of the killings and kidnappings for about two hours.
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A timeline of the events during the terror attack on Kibbutz Nir Oz:
(Photo: IDF Spokesperson's Unit)
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Despite their resistance, the terrorists entered every home except for six. The destruction in Nir Oz was extensive, though less severe than in Kfar Aza or Be'eri, as no IDF tanks or bulldozers entered the kibbutz. However, widespread arson, looting and vandalism left deep scars.
Apart from a brief tank intervention at 9:55 a.m. that killed a few terrorists before withdrawing to rescue another unit, Nir Oz was defended only from the air. Israeli Air Force helicopters struggled to establish situational awareness but managed to eliminate dozens of terrorists.
However, they also mistakenly struck some hostages. The failure to coordinate aerial reports with the desperate messages from trapped residents highlighted a critical breakdown in communication.
Key mistakes and lessons from the investigation
No operational processes were taken to analyze the images from the surveillance, attack helicopters or civilian reports due to the collapse of the operations room and a lack of understanding by the General Staff and Southern Command, overwhelmed by numerous reports from various combat zones.
The nearby IDF camp, which was supposed to protect the kibbutz, was not built as a fortified position and resembled a basic field base, similar to the Nahal Oz base. As a result, it was quickly overrun and the forces there were engaged in defensive battles instead of moving out to protect the surrounding towns. Nevertheless, the report concluded that the base should not have fallen as it did.
A major error was the established procedure in the Gaza Division, which prioritized border protection over safeguarding nearby settlements like Nir Oz. This led to a critical hour being wasted, as forces from the sector did not reach the towns near the border area.
The local alert squad consisted of 16 members, but only 9 were present and all were either kidnapped or killed that morning. Four of them formed an expanded team with three armed civilians, while three others fought near their homes against waves of attackers.
The investigation recommended to ensure that at least 10% of each town's residents near hostile borders should have rifles, not just personal handguns, in addition to the local alert squad.
The reasons for the major failure in Nir Oz were the delayed arrival of forces. Southern Command’s decision on October 7 to flood the Gaza envelope with troops was correct but lacked focus. Troops were not sent to specific locations and many soldiers were halted by the first combat zone they encountered or diverted by sporadic calls and messages on the phone or WhatsApp.
Nir Oz, located on the outskirts of a cluster of settlements in the Gaza envelope and not on the main road (Route 232), was overlooked and neglected.
Intelligence failure on October 7: Southern Command blamed Unit 8200 not only for blindness leading up to the invasion but also for the long and difficult day of the massacre. If SIGINT (signals intelligence) had been used to track cell phone and radio communications throughout the day, the large movement of hundreds of Hamas fighters in Nir Oz could have been detected.
Two reserve platoons from the Egoz Brigade were on standby for the Gaza Division from the Tze'elim base on Friday and were sent to reinforce the West Bank. However, the investigation raised doubts about their relevance to the situation in Nir Oz specifically, as they could have been fighting in other combat zones just as effectively.
Central timeline – Nir Oz
6:40 a.m. – After dozens out of 450 rocket and mortar launches targeting the outposts in the Kisufim sector, the IDF's divisional operations room receives the first indications of terrorist infiltrations from the border fence.
6:42 a.m. – The southern brigade commander responsible for the sector, Col. Asaf Hamami, leaves the regional division base in Re’im toward Kibbutz Nirim near Nir Oz. He declares a readiness for war over the communication network and calls for the mobilization of standby squads and special units, but is killed in battle shortly after near the entrance to Nirim.
6:45 a.m. – Two out of three surveillance posts in the sector are taken out due to a precise Hamas attack on IDF observation towers. No rear command processes the severe footage being transmitted from the sole remaining operational post.
6:49 a.m. – Two vehicles from a nearby party manage to enter Kibbutz Nir Oz at high speed but the three following vehicles are hit by gunfire from the first terrorists invading Nir Oz from its northern corner.
6:51 a.m. – Former hostage Sagui Dekel-Chen is alerted and reports detail an exchange of fire in the area. His later heroism as a lookout for the local alert squad will help prevent an even greater massacre.
6:57 a.m. – The first and main Hamas attack wave, consisting of about 150 Nukhba terrorists, takes over the kibbutz almost unopposed.
7:00 a.m. – Golani soldiers struggle to reach Kibbutz Nir Oz and nearby settlements as they are engaged in defensive battles in the area and at outposts.
7:05 a.m. – There is no command and control over the Nir Oz area after Col. Hamami also falls in battle, losing communication with him. He is effectively declared missing.
7:08 a.m. – Golani officer Capt. Omer Wolf manages to issue a critical command before being killed in battle at an IDF outpost near Nir Oz: Instead of deploying toward the border as per the division’s standard procedure — which proved to be flawed — forces should move inland toward the sector’s settlements. Wolf does not live to see his directive implemented; he is killed 20 minutes later in battle.
7:14 a.m. – Dekel-Chen reports in an internal WhatsApp group that some terrorists dressed as soldiers inside the kibbutz clinic. This report prevents injured civilians from approaching what has become a death zone. The kibbutz security coordinator tries to link up with a Golani force but fails and launches a solo assault.
He is wounded by gunfire, manages to extract himself to his home's shelter, and struggles to communicate due to poor reception in the following hours. Seven members of the alert squad, including armed civilians, become the only force fighting in the kibbutz against over 100 Nukhba terrorists swarming every corner.
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A graphic detailing the number of IDF troops versus the number of enemy forces in the battle at Kibbutz Nir Oz
(Photo: IDF Spokesperson's Unit)
7:28 a.m. – The terrorists reach the kibbutz's Thai workers' housing complex. A massacre ensues, exacerbated by language barriers and desperate screams of confusion. Nine workers are brutally murdered.
7:49 a.m. – Ohad Yahalomi, a 50-year-old kibbutz member, fights the terrorists. Later in the morning, he is kidnapped to Gaza and murdered in captivity.
8:20-8:30 a.m. – The terrorists focus on abducting civilians from the kibbutz. Residents attempt to hide, escape and scatter but are unsuccessful and are taken hostage by Hamas. Among them are Ofer, Erez and Sahar Kalderon, as well as Oded and Yocheved Lifshitz.
8:41 a.m. – The last battle of the kibbutz's standby squad lasts until 9:00 a.m. By its end, Tamir Eder, Dolev Yehud and Aviv Atzili are murdered. The rest are wounded or kidnapped. The small Nir Oz standby squad's two-hour-long fierce fight delays the Nukhba terrorists, but the IDF does not arrive.
8:45 a.m. – The kidnappings continue. The Cooper family is abducted in their car. Ronen Engel from the kibbutz is killed while trying to prevent terrorists from kidnapping his family.
8:46 a.m. – Two IDF companies arrive to fight at Ma'on Junction. However, no IDF command directs the 150 soldiers to run even the two miles to nearby Nir Oz. The large force halts its fight at the junction due to another mission to reach Kisufim and Kerem Shalom. On the way, they rescue hostages, engage in combat and encounter ambushes.
9:22 a.m. – The first IDF force reaches Kibbutz Nir Oz, but from the air: an Air Force attack helicopter hovers over the settlement, requesting authorization to fire into Israeli territory. Initial identification is difficult due to distinguishing between terrorists and civilians. The helicopter takes fire from terrorists and is forced into an emergency landing.
Additional helicopters arrive in five waves around 10:00 a.m., killing dozens of terrorists attempting a second-wave infiltration but also mistakenly killing Efrat Katz. Mika and Yuval Engel are injured by helicopter fire while their captors are transporting them to Gaza.
9:47 a.m. – The terrorists do not waste time with the siege on residents barricaded in safe rooms and refusing to exit. House torchings begin, leading to fatalities.
9:55 a.m. – A lone tank arrives at the kibbutz's northern gate, identifies several terrorists, fires and eliminates two. The force then leaves for another combat zone without realizing what is happening inside the kibbutz.
10:08 a.m. – Matan Zangauker is kidnapped from the kibbutz, followed minutes later by his partner being kidnapped separately.
11:15 a.m. – The only force sent to Nir Oz, an elite Sayeret Matkal team, encounters a large Nukhba unit ambush at Ma'on Junction, engaging in an hour-and-a-half-long battle during which the team commander is killed. After sweeping the junction, the force decides to head to Kibbutz Re’im and Be'eri due to mounting distress reports, while no more reports emerge from Nir Oz.
11:55 a.m. – Carmela and Noya Dan, grandmother and granddaughter, are the last murdered in Kibbutz Nir Oz.
1:10 p.m. – A Border Police undercover unit is the first to enter the kibbutz, 40 minutes after the last of the 400-500 terrorists leave Nir Oz. The unit is left to evacuate surviving residents and treat the wounded.
First published: 10:42, 03.14.25